NC DEALERS – NEW STATUTE WITH SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES

Posted 7/5/18…      The General Assembly passed the following law, with some important changes. 
You now have 20 days to deliver paperwork to the tag office after issuing a 30 day tag.  Yay!!!  
 
The new law also allows you to sell a vehicle without having the title, under certain restrictions.  Before you get too excited, the new law requires that you use forms developed and approved by DMV, and DMV has not yet developed those forms.  I will keep you updated when the forms are made available. Basically, the following restrictions apply.  This is based on my reading of the statute, so please understand DMV may interpret it differently.  As always, you should check with your DMV Inspector or your attorney before changing your business practices in order to sell vehicles without the title.
 
  • Vehicle must be currently titled in NC
  • Submit a sworn statement to DMV that all liens have been paid
  • That you are unable to obtain the title because:
    • The title was not delivered to you
    • The title has been lost or misplaced
  • Knowing and intentionally filing a false statement will be a felony offense
  • Once you have the title, you have to send it to DMV and keep a copy
  • You must deliver the title to DMV within 20 days of receipt of the title, no later than 60 days after the sale
  • If you offer a vehicle for sale without having the title, you must notify the potential buyer in writing before the sale that you do not have the title
  • If the title is lost, you must apply for a duplicate title within 5 days of the date of sale
  • If you fail to deliver title within 60 days, the buyer has a right to get their  money/trade-in back, plus 5% of the purchase price up to $1000.00, if they request it in writing within 10 days
  • You can still face potential civil suits and criminal charges
Here is the statute itself:
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA
SESSION 2017
 
SESSION LAW 2018-42
SENATE BILL 411
 
 
AN ACT TO EXPAND THE REQUIRED USE OF THE ELECTRONIC LIEN SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED BY THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, TO REVISE THE LAW GOVERNING WHEN A MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER THAT DOES NOT HAVE A MOTOR VEHICLE’S STATEMENT OF ORIGIN OR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE MAY TRANSFER TITLE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE, AND TO MAKE OTHER CHANGES TO LAWS AFFECTING MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
SECTION 1.  G.S. 20‑58.4A(i) reads as rewritten:
“(i)       Mandatory Participation. – Beginning July 1, 2016, allAll individuals and lienholders who are normally engaged in the business or practice of financing motor vehicles, and who conduct at least five transactions annually,annually shall utilize the electronic lien system implemented in subsection (a) of this section to record information concerning the perfection and release of a security interest in a vehicle.”
SECTION 2.(a)  G.S. 20‑52.1(d) reads as rewritten:
“(d)      When a manufacturer’s statement of origin or an existing certificate of title on a motor vehicle is unavailable, a motor vehicle dealer licensed under Article 12 of this Chapter may also transfer title to a vehicle currently titled in this State to another by certifying in writing in a sworn statement to the Division thatsigned by the dealer principal, general manager, general sales manager, controller, or owner of the dealership that, to the best of the signatory’s knowledge and information as of the date of sworn certification, all prior perfected liens on the vehicle that are known or reasonably ascertainable by the signatory have been paid and that the motor vehicle dealer, despite having used reasonable diligence, is unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title. For purposes of this subsection, a dealer may certify that the dealer is unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title because the statement of origin or certificate of title was either (i) not delivered to the dealer or (ii) lost or misplaced. The Division is authorized to require any information it deems necessary for the transfer of the vehicle and shall develop a form for this purpose. The knowing and intentional filing of a false sworn certification with the Division pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a Class H felony. A dealer principal, owner, or manager who is not a signatory of the sworn certification under this subsection may only be charged for a criminal violation for filing a false certification under this subsection by another dealership employee if the dealer principal, owner, or manager had actual knowledge of the falsity of the sworn certification at the time the sworn certification was submitted to the Division. The dealer shall hold harmless and indemnify the consumer‑purchaser from any damages arising from the use of the procedure authorized by this subsection. No person shall have a cause of action against the Division or Division contractors arising from the transfer of a vehicle by a sworn certification pursuant to this section.
SECTION 2.(b)  G.S. 20‑58 reads as rewritten:
“§ 20‑58.  Perfection by indication of security interest on certificate of title.
(a)        Except as provided in G.S. 20‑58.8, a security interest in a vehicle of a type for which a certificate of title is required shall be perfected only as hereinafter provided.
(1)        If the vehicle is not registered in this State, the application for notation of a security interest shall be the application for certificate of title provided for in G.S. 20‑52.
(2)        If the vehicle is registered in this State, the application for notation of a security interest shall be in the form prescribed by the Division, signed by the debtor, and contain the date of application of each security interest, and name and address of the secured party from whom information concerning the security interest may be obtained. The application must be accompanied by the existing certificate of title unless in the possession of a prior secured party.party or in the event the manufacturer’s statement of origin or existing certificate of title (i) was not delivered to the dealer or (ii) was lost or misplaced on the date the dealer sells or transfers the motor vehicle. If there is an existing certificate of title issued by this or any other jurisdiction in the possession of a prior secured party, the application for notation of the security interest shall in addition contain the name and address of such prior secured party. An application for notation of a security interest may be signed by the secured party instead of the debtor when the application is accompanied by documentary evidence of the applicant’s security interest in that motor vehicle signed by the debtor and by affidavit of the applicant stating the reason the debtor did not sign the application. In the event the certificate cannot be obtained for recordation of the security interest, when title remains in the name of the debtor, the Division shall cancel the certificate and issue a new certificate of title listing all the respective security interests.
(3)        If the application for notation of security interest is made in order to continue the perfection of a security interest perfected in another jurisdiction, it may be signed by the secured party instead of the debtor. Such application shall be accompanied by documentary evidence of a perfected security interest. No such application shall be valid unless an application for a certificate of title has been made in North Carolina. The security interest perfected herein shall be subject to the provisions set forth in G.S. 20‑58.5.
(b)        When If a manufacturer’s statement of origin or an existing certificate of title on a motor vehicle is unavailable,was (i) not delivered to the dealer or (ii) was lost or misplaced on or prior to the date the dealer sells or transfers the motor vehicle, a first lienholder who holds a valid license as a motor vehicle dealer issued by the Commissioner under Article 12 of this Chapter or his designee may file a notarized copy of an instrument creating and evidencing a security interest in the motor vehicle with the Division of Motor Vehicles. A filing pursuant to this subsection shall constitute constructive notice to all persons of the security interest in the motor vehicle described in the filing. The constructive notice shall be effective from the date of the filing on the date of the security agreement if the filing is made within 20 days after the date of the security agreement. The constructive notice shall date from the date of the filing with the Division if it is made more than 20 days after the date of the security agreement. The notation of a security interest created under this subsection shall automatically expire 60 days after the date of the creation of the security interest, or upon perfection of the security interest as provided in subsection (a) of this section, whichever occurs first. A security interest notation made under this subsection and then later perfected under subsection (a) of this section shall be presumed to have been perfected on the date of the earlier filing. The Division may charge a fee not to exceed ten dollars ($10.00) for each notation of security interest filed pursuant to this subsection. The fee shall be credited to the Highway Fund. A false filing with the Division pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a Class H felony. It shall constitute a Class H felony for a person to knowingly and intentionally file a false notice with the Division pursuant to this subsection. A dealer principal, owner, or manager of a motor vehicle dealership who is not a signatory of the notice required under this subsection may only be charged for a criminal violation for filing a false notice with the Division under this subsection by another dealership employee if the dealer principal, owner, or manager had actual knowledge of the falsity of the filing at the time the filing was submitted to the Division.
….”
SECTION 2.(c)  G.S. 20‑72(b) reads as rewritten:
“(b)      In order to assign or transfer title or interest in any motor vehicle registered under the provisions of this Article, the owner shall execute in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths an assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the certificate of title in form approved by the Division, including in such assignment the name and address of the transferee; and no title to any motor vehicle shall pass or vest until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the transferee. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any foreclosure or repossession under a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract or any judicial sale. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to (i) any transfer to an insurer pursuant to G.S. 20‑109.1(b)(2) or (ii) any transfer to a used motor vehicle dealer pursuant to G.S. 20‑109.1(e1).
When a manufacturer’s statement of origin or an existing certificate of title on a motor vehicle is unavailable, a motor vehicle dealer licensed under Article 12 of this Chapter may also transfer title to a vehicle currently titled in this State to another by certifying in writing in a sworn statement to the Division that is signed by the dealer principal, general manager, general sales manager, controller, or owner of the dealership that, to the best of the signatory’s knowledge and information as of the date of the sworn certification, all prior perfected liens on the vehicle that are known or reasonably ascertainable by the signatory have been paid and that the motor vehicle dealer, despite having used reasonable diligence, is was unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title. For purposes of this subsection, a dealer may certify that the dealer is unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title if the statement of origin or certificate of title has either (i) not been delivered to the dealer or (ii) has been lost or misplaced. The Division is authorized to request any information it deems necessary to transfer the vehicle and shall develop a form for this purpose. The filing of a false sworn certification with the Division pursuant to this paragraph The knowing and intentional filing of a false sworn certification with the Division pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a Class H felony. A dealer principal, owner, or manager of a motor vehicle dealership who is not a signatory of the sworn certification required under this subsection may only be charged for a criminal violation for filing a false certification under this subsection by another dealership employee if the dealer principal, owner, or manager had actual knowledge of the falsity of the sworn certification at the time the sworn certification was submitted to the Division.
Any person transferring title or interest in a motor vehicle shall deliver the certificate of title duly assigned in accordance with the foregoing provision to the transferee at the time of delivering the vehicle, except when a certificate of title is unavailable as provided in this subsection or in G.S. 20‑72.1, and except that where a security interest is obtained in the motor vehicle from the transferee in payment of the purchase price or otherwise, the transferor shall deliver the certificate of title to the lienholder and the lienholder shall forward the certificate of title together with the transferee’s application for new title and necessary fees to the Division within 20 days. If the title to a vehicle is unavailable and the dealer transfers the vehicle on a sworn certification pursuant to this section or G.S. 20‑52.1, and the title is subsequently received or found by the dealer, the dealer shall retain a copy for its records and submit the title to the Division. Any person who delivers or accepts a certificate of title assigned in blank shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. No person shall have a cause of action against the Division or Division contractors arising from the transfer of a vehicle by a sworn certification pursuant to this section.
The title to a salvage vehicle shall be forwarded to the Division as provided in G.S. 20‑109.1, except with respect to the title of any salvage vehicle transferred pursuant to G.S. 20‑109.1(b)(2) or G.S. 20‑109.1(e1).”
SECTION 2.(d)  Part 4 of Article 3 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes is amended by adding a new section to read:
§ 20‑72.1.  Transfer by owner when a certificate of title is unavailable; consumer remedies.
(a)        Notwithstanding any other provision in this Article, when a manufacturer’s statement of origin or an existing certificate of title on a motor vehicle is unavailable, a motor vehicle dealer licensed under Article 12 of this Chapter shall deliver the manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title to the Division within 20 days of receipt of the title, but no later than 60 days following the later of the date of the sale or transfer of the vehicle or the date of the creation of a security interest in the vehicle pursuant to G.S. 20‑58(b). The dealer may offer the vehicle for sale provided that the purchaser is given written notice prior to sale that the dealer is not in possession of the manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title and that the purchaser may be entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to subsection (b) of this section if the dealer fails to deliver the manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title to the Division in accordance with this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, a vehicle’s manufacturer’s statement of origin or existing certificate of title shall be considered unavailable under either of the following circumstances:
(1)        The manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title has not been actually delivered to the dealer on or prior to the date the dealer sold or transferred the vehicle.
(2)        The manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title was lost or misplaced on or prior to the date the dealer sold or transferred the vehicle. If the motor vehicle being sold or transferred is a used motor vehicle, the dealer is required to make application to the Division for a duplicate title within five working days of the date of the sale or transfer of the vehicle. If the vehicle being sold or transferred is a new motor vehicle, the dealer is required to request a new or duplicate manufacturer’s statement of origin from the applicable manufacturer or distributor within five working days of the date of the sale or transfer of the vehicle.
(b)        In any case where a dealer fails to deliver the manufacturer’s statement of origin or certificate of title to the Division within the 60‑day time period allowed in subsection (a) of this section, the vehicle purchaser may elect to receive liquidated damages from the dealer in the amount of five percent (5%) of the vehicle purchase price, not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), provided that the dealer receives written demand for liquidated damages from the purchaser within 10 days after the expiration of the 60‑day period provided in subsection (a) of this section. The liquidated damages provided in this subsection shall be payable by the dealer within 30 days after the receipt of the purchaser’s written demand. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any other civil remedies or consumer protections available to the vehicle purchaser.
SECTION 2.(e)  G.S. 20‑79.1(h) reads as rewritten:
“(h)      Temporary registration plates or markers shall expire and become void upon the receipt of the limited registration plates or the annual registration plates from the Division, or upon the rescission of a contract to purchase a motor vehicle, or upon the expiration of 30 days from the date of issuance, depending upon whichever event shall first occur. No refund or credit or fees paid by dealers to the Division for temporary registration plates or markers shall be allowed, except in the event that the Division discontinues the issuance of temporary registration plates or markers or unless the dealer discontinues business. In this event the unissued registration plates or markers with the unissued registration certificates shall be returned to the Division and the dealer may petition for a refund. Upon the expiration of the 30 days from the date of issuance, a second 30‑day temporary registration plate or marker may be issued by the dealer upon showing the vehicle has been sold, a temporary lien has been filed as provided in G.S. 20‑58, and that the dealer, having used reasonable diligence, is unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title so that the lien may be perfected. For purposes of this subsection, a dealer shall be considered unable to obtain the vehicle’s statement of origin or certificate of title if the statement of origin or certificate of title either (i) has not been delivered to the dealer or (ii) was lost or misplaced.
SECTION 2.(f)  The Division of Motor Vehicles, in consultation with the North Carolina Automobile Dealers Association, Inc., shall study the following:
(1)        The impacts of this section on Division processes and procedures, along with recommended statutory changes to further improve the lawful transfer of motor vehicles.
(2)        Methods to ensure consumer protection in the motor vehicle transfer process.
(3)        Potential changes to the Division’s electronic lien and title program or other processes that could assist with reducing the delay in the release of a satisfied security interest in a motor vehicle.
(4)        Any other issues the Division deems appropriate.
The Division shall report its findings, including any legislative recommendations, to the Joint Legislative Transportation Oversight Committee by December 31, 2020.
SECTION 2.(g)  G.S. 20‑73(a) reads as rewritten:
“(a)      Time Limit. – A person to whom a vehicle is transferred, whether by purchase or otherwise, must apply to the Division for a new certificate of title. An application for a certificate of title must be submitted within 28 days after the vehicle is transferred. A person who must follow the procedure in G.S. 20‑76 to get a certificate of title and who applies for a title within the required 20‑day time limit or who transfers title to a vehicle pursuant to a sworn certificate pursuant to G.S. 20‑52.1(d) is considered to have complied with this section even when the Division issues a certificate of title to the person after the time limit has elapsed.
A person may apply directly for a certificate of title or may allow another person, such as the person from whom the vehicle is transferred or a person who has a lien on the vehicle, to apply for a certificate of title on that person’s behalf. A person to whom a vehicle is transferred is responsible for getting a certificate of title within the time limit regardless of whether the person allowed another to apply for a certificate of title on the person’s behalf.”
SECTION 2.(h)  Subsection 2(f) of this section is effective when it becomes law. The remainder of this section becomes effective January 1, 2019.
SECTION 3.(a)  G.S. 20‑79.02(g) reads as rewritten:
“(g)      Applicability. – Prior to January 1, 2019,2021, a new motor vehicle dealer may, but is not required to, display an LD license plate on a service loaner vehicle. Beginning on or after January 1, 2019,2021, a new motor vehicle dealer shall display an LD license plate on any new motor vehicle placed into service as a loaner vehicle if either of the following circumstances exists:
(1)        The new motor vehicle dealer is receiving incentive or warranty compensation from a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or distributor branch for the use of the vehicle as a service loaner.
(2)        The new motor vehicle dealer is receiving a fee or other compensation from the dealer’s customers for the use of the vehicle as a service loaner.”
SECTION 3.(b)  Section 1.1(b) of S.L. 2015‑232 reads as rewritten:
SECTION 1.1.(b)  This section is effective when this act becomes law and expires December 31, 2018.2020.
SECTION 3.(c)  Section 1.4(b) of S.L. 2015‑232 reads as rewritten:
SECTION 1.4.(b)  This section is effective when this act becomes law and expires December 31, 2018.2020.
SECTION 4.  G.S. 20‑79.1(d) reads as rewritten:
“(d)      A dealer shall:
(1)        Not issue, assign, transfer, or deliver temporary registration plates or markers to anyone other than a bona fide purchaser or owner of a vehicle which he has sold.
(2)        Not issue a temporary registration plate or marker without first obtaining from the purchaser or owner a written application for titling and registration of the vehicle and the applicable fees.
(3)        Within 10 working days,20 days of the issuance of a temporary registration plate or marker, mail or deliver the application and fees to the Division or deliver the application and fees to a local license agency for processing. Delivery need not be made if the contract for sale has been rescinded in writing by all parties to the contract.
(4)        Not deliver a temporary registration plate to anyone purchasing a vehicle that has an unexpired registration plate that is to be transferred to the purchaser.
(5)        Not lend to anyone, or use on any vehicle that he may own, any temporary registration plates or markers.
A dealer may issue temporary markers, without obtaining the written application for titling and registration or collecting the applicable fees, to nonresidents for the purpose of removing the vehicle from the State.”
SECTION 5. G.S. 20‑183.4C(a)(1) reads as rewritten:
“(1)      A new vehicle must be inspected before it is sold delivered to a purchaser at retail in this State. Upon purchase, a receipt approved by the Division must be provided to the new owner certifying compliance.”
SECTION 6.  G.S. 105‑562 reads as rewritten:
“§ 105‑562.  Collection and scope.
(a)        Collection. – A tax or a tax increase levied under this Article becomes effective on the date set by the board of trustees in the resolution levying the tax or the tax increase. The effective date must be the first day of a month and may not be earlier than the first day of the sixth calendar month after the board of trustees adopts the resolution. To the extent the tax applies to vehicles whose tax situs is in a county the entire area of which is within the jurisdiction of the Authority, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall collect and administer the tax. To the extent the tax applies to vehicles whose tax situs is in a county that is only partially within the jurisdiction of the county, the Authority shall collect and administer the tax. The Authority may contract with one or more local governments in its jurisdiction to collect the tax on its behalf.
Upon receipt of the resolutions under G.S. 105‑561, the Division of Motor Vehicles shall proceed to collect and administer the tax as provided in this Article. The tax is due at the same time and subject to the same restrictions as in G.S. 20‑87(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7) and G.S. 20‑88. The Division of Motor Vehicles may adopt rules to carry out its responsibilities under this Article.
(b)        Scope. – Only vehicles required to pay a tax under G.S. 20‑87(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7) and G.S. 20‑88 shall be subject to the tax provided by this Article. Taxes shall be prorated in accordance with G.S. 20‑95.
(c)        Tax Situs. – The tax situs of a motor vehicle for the purpose of this Article is its ad valorem tax situs. If the vehicle is exempt from ad valorem tax, its tax situs for the purpose of this Article is the ad valorem tax situs it would have if it were not exempt from ad valorem tax.
(d)       Any tax or tax increase levied under this Article applicable to a motor vehicle sold or leased by a motor vehicle dealer, as defined in G.S. 20‑286(11), is only applicable to a motor vehicle sale or lease made on or after the effective date of the tax or tax increase regardless of the date of submission of a title and registration application for the motor vehicle to the Division of Motor Vehicles. No tax or tax increase levied under this Article applies to a motor vehicle sale or lease made prior to the effective date of the tax or tax increase.
SECTION 7.  G.S. 105‑570 reads as rewritten:
“§ 105‑570.  County Vehicle Registration Tax; shared with municipalities.
(a)        A county is considered an authority under Article 51 of this Chapter, and the board of commissioners of that county is considered the board of trustees of the authority under Article 51, except that the maximum tax that may be levied by a county under this Article is seven dollars ($7.00) per year.
(b)        A county may not levy a tax under this Article unless the county or at least one unit of local government in the county operates a public transportation system.
(c)        Any tax levied under this Article shall, after the receipt of those funds from the Division of Motor Vehicles, be retained or distributed by the county on a per capita basis as it receives those funds as follows:
(1)        Pro rata (i) retained by the county based on the population of the county that is not in an incorporated area, and (ii) distributed to the municipalities within the county based on the population of that municipality that is located within that county. To determine the population of each county and municipality, the county shall use the most recent annual estimate of population certified by the State Budget Officer.
(2)        Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection, if a municipality to which funds are to be distributed does not operate a public transportation system, the population of that municipality shall be excluded from the calculations of subdivision (1) of this subsection and no distribution shall be made to that municipality.
(3)        Notwithstanding subdivision (1) of this subsection, if a county for which funds are to be retained does not operate a public transportation system, the population of that county not in an incorporated area shall be excluded from the calculations of subdivision (1) of this subsection, and the county shall not retain any funds.
If a county that does not retain funds or a municipality that does not receive an allocation of funds on account of subdivision (2) or (3) of this subsection begins to operate a public transportation system, that county or municipality shall begin retaining or receiving funds beginning the first day of July that is more than 30 days thereafter.
(d)       The proceeds of a tax imposed under this Article may be used by that county or municipality only to operate a public transportation system, including financing, constructing, operating, and maintaining that public transportation system. The term “public transportation system” has the same meaning as defined in G.S. 105‑506.1.
(e)        As used in this section, operation of a public transportation system includes a contract or interlocal agreement for operation of the public transportation system by another county or municipality, or by a transportation authority created under (i) a municipal charter; or (ii) Article 25, 26, or 27 of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes. As used in this section, operation of a public transportation system also includes a contract with a private entity for operation of the public transportation system.
(f)        An interlocal agreement under this section may also deal with allocation of funds between a municipality and county for operation by the county of a human services public transportation system within the municipality when the municipality also operates a public transportation system.
(g)        This Article is supplemental to Article 51 of this Chapter.
(h)        Any tax or tax increase levied under this Article applicable to a motor vehicle sold or leased by a motor vehicle dealer, as defined in G.S. 20‑286(11), is only applicable to a motor vehicle sale or lease made on or after the effective date of the tax or tax increase regardless of the date of submission of a title and registration application for the motor vehicle to the Division of Motor Vehicles. No tax or tax increase levied under this Article applies to a motor vehicle sale or lease made prior to the effective date of the tax or tax increase.
SECTION 8.  G.S. 20‑4.02 reads as rewritten:
“§ 20‑4.02.  Quadrennial adjustment of certain fees and rates.
(a)        Adjustment for Inflation. – Beginning July 1, 2020, and every four years thereafter, the Division shall adjust the fees and rates imposed pursuant to the statutes listed in this subsection for inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The adjustment for per transaction rates in subdivision (8a) of this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest cent and all other adjustments under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest twenty‑five cents (25¢):
(1)        G.S. 20‑7.
(2)        G.S. 20‑11.
(3)        G.S. 20‑14.
(4)        G.S. 20‑16.
(5)        G.S. 20‑26.
(6)        G.S. 20‑37.15.
(7)        G.S. 20‑37.16.
(8)        G.S. 20‑42(b).
(8a)      G.S. 20‑63(h), with respect to the per transaction rates set in that subsection.
(9)        G.S. 20‑85(a)(1) through (10).
(10)      G.S. 20‑85.1.
(11)      G.S. 20‑87, except for the additional fee set forth in G.S. 20‑87(6) for private motorcycles.
(12)      G.S. 20‑88.
(13)      G.S. 20‑289.
(14)      G.S. 20‑385.
(15)      G.S. 44A‑4(b)(1).
(b)        Computation. – In determining the rate of inflation to use when making an adjustment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Division shall base the rate on the percent change in the annual Consumer Price Index over the preceding four‑year period.
(c)        Rules. – The provisions of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes shall not apply to the inflation adjustment required by this section.
(d)       Consultation and Publication. – At least 90 days prior to making an adjustment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, and notwithstanding any provision of G.S. 12‑3.1 to the contrary, the Division shall (i) consult with the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, (ii) provide a report to the chairs of the Senate Appropriations Committee on Department of Transportation and the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on Transportation, and (iii) publish notice of the fees that will be in effect in the offices of the Division and on the Division’s Web site.
(e)        Effective Date. – Any adjustment to fees or rates under this section applicable to a motor vehicle sold or leased by a motor vehicle dealer, as defined in G.S. 20‑286(11), is only applicable to a motor vehicle sale or lease made on or after the effective date of the fee or rate adjustment regardless of the date of submission of a title and registration application for the motor vehicle to the Division. No adjustment to fees or rates under this section applies to a motor vehicle sale or lease made prior to the effective date of the fee or rate adjustment.
SECTION 9.  Sections 6 and 7 of this act are effective when they become law and apply to any tax or tax increase with an effective date on or after that date. Except as otherwise provided, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law.
In the General Assembly read three times and ratified this the 14th day of June, 2018.
                                                                    s/  Philip E. Berger
                                                                         President Pro Tempore of the Senate
                                                                    s/  Tim Moore
                                                                         Speaker of the House of Representatives
                                                                    s/  Roy Cooper
                                                                         Governor
Approved 9:25 a.m. this 22nd day of June, 2018
Posted in NC

The CARLAWYER©03/18

By Thomas B. Hudson and Nicole F. Munro

Here’s our monthly article on legal developments in the auto sales, finance and lease world.  This month, we’re reporting on activities of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Department of Justice and the courts.  As usual, this month’s article features our “Case of the Month.”

Note that this column does not offer legal advice.  Always check with your lawyer to learn how what we report might apply to you, or if you have questions.

This Month’s CARLAWYER© Compliance Tip

It’s that time of year again – dealer and finance company associations are gearing up for their spring conferences.  If you plan to attend one or more of these in search of ways to improve your operations, remember as you listen to the various presenters that state laws governing what dealers can and cannot do vary.  What’s permitted in State A might be a violation of the law in State B.  To put it another way, what might win an award in a 20-group’s “Best Ideas” contest might be legal in State A but might constitute a felony in State B.  So if you pick up a great idea at a conference, make sure that your lawyer blesses it for your state before you implement it.  And don’t forget to visit us at the CounselorLibrary.com booth and listen in on a few compliance sessions.

Federal Developments

Servicemembers and Leasing.  On February 22, the Department of Justice announced that it settled a case against a captive auto finance company, resolving allegations that the company violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by failing to refund certain up-front lease amounts to servicemembers who lawfully terminated their vehicle leases early.

This is the first DOJ case addressing a vehicle lessor’s SCRA obligation to refund certain types of lease payments.  The SCRA allows servicemembers to end vehicle leases early after entering military service or receiving qualifying military orders for a permanent change of station or to deploy.

When servicemembers lawfully terminate vehicle leases, the SCRA requires that they be refunded all lease amounts paid in advance.  At issue in this case is which categories of fees are paid “in advance” that must be refunded under the SCRA.

The DOJ alleged that part of the lease’s capitalized cost reduction (“CCR”) is subject to a pro rata refund.  The CCR is an amount the consumer pays to the dealer at lease signing that reduces the amount of lease payments.  The CCR could come from a consumer’s cash payment, trade-in equity, or rebate or other credit provided by the manufacturer, lessor, or a third party.

Lessors have often contended that none of the CCR is an amount paid in advance on the lease, but rather the CCR acts as a form of down payment, retained by the dealer and not paid to or received by the lease assignee.

Without admitting factual allegations or statements of law, the finance company agreed to refund over $2 million to 492 servicemembers and their co-lessees.  In addition, the company will pay $60,788 to the U.S. Treasury.

What’s the Plan?  On February 12, the CFPB released its 5-year strategic plan.  The plan sets forth the CFPB’s mission to regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services under the federal consumer financial laws and to educate and empower consumers to make better-informed financial decisions.  CFPB’s strategic goals include: (1) to ensure that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services; (2) to implement and enforce the law consistently to ensure that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive; and (3) to foster operational excellence through efficient and effective processes, governance, and security of resources and information.  Acting Director Mulvaney stated: “If there is one way to summarize the strategic changes occurring at the Bureau, it is this:  we have committed to fulfill the Bureau’s statutory responsibilities, but go no further.”

New CFPB Faces.  On February 6, Mulvaney named Kirsten Sutton Mork as the CFPB’s new chief of staff.  Mork has been staff director of the House Financial Services Committee since early 2017.  In addition, on January 30, Mulvaney advised CFPB staff that the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity will be transferred to the Director’s Office, as part of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Fairness.  The Office of Fair Lending will continue to focus on advocacy, coordination, and education, but will no longer have enforcement responsibility.

More Information, Please!  The CFPB recently issued five Requests for Information as part of Mulvaney’s call for evidence to ensure the CFPB is fulfilling its proper and appropriate functions to best protect consumers.  These RFIs invite the public to submit feedback and suggest ways to improve outcomes for both consumers and covered entities.  We reported last month on the first of these, dealing with the CFPB’s civil investigative demand process.  Here are four more CFPB RFIs.

The CFPB’s second RFI seeks public comment on whether and how the CFPB might improve its administrative adjudication processes, including its Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, which pertain to the general conduct of administrative adjudication proceedings; the initiation of such proceedings and prehearing rules; hearings; decisions and appeals; and temporary cease-and-desist proceedings.  Comments are due by April 6, 2018.

The CFPB’s third RFI seeks information to assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of its processes related to the enforcement of federal consumer financial laws.  Comments are due by April 13, 2018.

The fourth RFI seeks information to assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the CFPB’s supervision program.  Comments are due by May 21, 2018.

Finally, the CFPB’s fifth RFI on external engagements seeks information on ways to engage the public and receive feedback on the agency’s work.  Comment deadlines for the fifth RFI have not yet been published.

No ACE up Their Sleeves?  On January 25, the Office of the Associate Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice issued a memorandum to its litigators announcing its policy regarding the use of agencies’ guidance documents in affirmative civil enforcement (“ACE”) cases.  The AAG states:  “Guidance documents cannot create binding requirements that do not already exist by statute or regulation.  Accordingly, effective immediately for ACE cases, the [DOJ] may not use its enforcement authority to effectively convert agency guidance documents into binding rules.  Likewise, [DOJ] litigators may not use noncompliance with guidance documents as a basis for proving violations of applicable law in ACE cases.  The [DOJ] may continue to use agency guidance documents for proper purposes in such cases.  For instance, some guidance documents simply explain or paraphrase legal mandates from existing statutes or regulations, and the [DOJ] may use evidence that a party read such a guidance document to help prove that the party had the requisite knowledge of the mandate.  However, the [DOJ] should not treat a party’s noncompliance with an agency guidance document as presumptively or conclusively establishing that the party violated the applicable statute or regulation.”

Case of the Month

 

Some lessons seem to require learning over and over again.  The lesson this month is:  Don’t employ multiple arbitration agreements in a single transaction.  Here’s what happened in a recent case.

Chuck Willis filed an adversary proceeding in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case against Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC.  Willis alleged that Tower Loan violated the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z by providing misleading and incorrect disclosures in his installment loan agreement with regard to, among other things, the credit insurance he bought in connection with the loan.

Tower Loan moved to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the loan agreement.  The agreement contained an arbitration disclaimer that said:  “By signing below and obtaining this loan, borrower agrees to the Arbitration Agreement on the additional pages of this agreement.  You should read it carefully before you sign below.  Important provisions, including our privacy policy, are contained on additional pages and incorporated herein.”  The reverse side of the loan agreement contained the Arbitration Agreement.

At the hearing on the motion, the parties presented to the court, for the first time, an Endorsement to Require Binding Arbitration, which represented the “additional pages” referenced in the arbitration disclaimer.  Willis argued that because the Arbitration Agreement and the Endorsement contained different and conflicting terms regarding the number of arbitrators, how the arbitrators will be selected, the notice required to arbitrate, the location of the arbitration, who pays the cost of arbitration, who would be entitled to attorneys’ fees and when, and when arbitration proceedings need not be initiated, there was no meeting of the minds with respect to arbitration.

The court denied Tower Loan’s motion to compel arbitration.  The court first addressed Tower Loan’s argument that the Arbitration Agreement and the Endorsement governed different issues and/or parties, and the dispute in this case was governed by the Arbitration Agreement.  The court disagreed, noting that both the Arbitration Agreement and the Endorsement governed claims against Tower Loan arising under the loan agreement, including any insurance purchased in connection with the loan.

The court went on to address the impact of the inconsistent and conflicting provisions and determined that, under Tenth Circuit precedent, the terms of the arbitration agreements were not “sufficiently definite” as required by Mississippi law, which governed the loan agreement.  Therefore, the court concluded that there was no “meeting of the minds” as to how to arbitrate claims under the arbitration agreements and, thus, no agreement to arbitrate.

Is it time to review your paperwork again?

In re Willis (Willis v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, LLC), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4243 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. December 12, 2017)

So, there’s this month’s roundup!  Stay legal, and we’ll see you next month.

________

Tom (thudson@hudco.com) is Of Counsel and Nikki (nmunro@hudco.com) is a Partner in the law firm of Hudson Cook, LLP. Tom has written several books and is the publisher of Spot Delivery®, a monthly legal newsletter for auto dealers. He is the CEO of CounselorLibrary.com, LLC and the Editor in Chief of CARLAW®, a monthly report of legal developments for the auto finance and leasing industry. Nikki is a contributing author to the F&I Legal Desk Book and frequently writes for Spot Delivery®. For information, visit www.counselorlibrary.com. © CounselorLibrary.com 2018, all rights reserved. Single publication rights only, to the Association. (3/18).  HC/4843-0068-2590v1.

The CARLAWYER©01/18

By Thomas B. Hudson and Nicole F. Munro

 

In November, President Trump left a brand-new pro-industry Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director under the auto finance and lease industry’s Christmas tree.  This should make for an interesting 2018 for all of us.  This month, we also report on activities of the House and Senate, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  As usual, this month’s article features our “Case of the Month.”

Note that this column does not offer legal advice. Always check with your lawyer to learn how what we report might apply to you, or if you have questions.

 

This Month’s CARLAWYER© Compliance Tip

 

Check out the Department of Defense item below.  If you sell and finance cars to military personnel, including military dependents, you need to get some quick schooling on what the DOD says is permitted and not permitted in connection with those transactions.  You’ll likely need your lawyer’s help on this one. Also, you should contact your consumer reporting agency about how to obtain MLA covered borrower status or get to know the Department of Defense’s website at https://mla.dmdc.osd.mil/mla/#/home.

 

Federal Developments

 

CFPB Leadership Shakeup.  On November 24, Richard Cordray resigned as CFPB Director and appointed his chief of staff, Leandra English, to become deputy director. A few hours later, President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, as acting director of the Bureau until the Senate confirms a permanent director, setting up a conflict with Cordray’s appointee. English then sued Mulvaney and the president in federal court, asking the court to restrain Mulvaney from heading the Bureau until a permanent director can be nominated and confirmed. Two days later, the judge denied English’s request for a temporary restraining order, and has not yet issued a decision on the merits of English’s claim that she has the authority to serve as acting CFPB director. Stay tuned.

 

Blocking Another CFPB Rule?  On December 1, a group of House Democrats and Republicans introduced a bill to block the CFPB’s so-called “small dollar rule” (regulating payday and title loans, among others) from going into effect. The proposed legislation exercises authority under the Congressional Review Act to prevent the rule from becoming effective on January 16. The CRA provides a procedure by which Congress can disapprove of rules issued by federal agencies within 60 legislative days of such rules being submitted to Congress for review. If both the House and the Senate vote to disapprove a rule, the agency may not issue any rule in substantially the same form in the future. Earlier this year, Congress used its CRA authority to block the CFPB’s arbitration rule. Remember the late-night tiebreaker vote by Vice President Pence?

 

CFPB Bulletin Deemed to be a “Rule,” and Invalid.  On December 5, the Government Accountability Office opined that the CFPB’s March 2013 bulletin on auto finance and compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act constitutes a “rule” subject to the Congressional Review Act.  Because the CFPB did not submit the bulletin for review, the 60-day review period never began to run and the bulletin is considered not yet effective. The controversial bulletin provided detailed expectations about steps indirect auto creditors must take to monitor differences in average retail and wholesale interest rates (so-called “markups”) between protected groups and non-protected groups under the ECOA. The bulletin also detailed the Bureau’s expectations for corrective action when a creditor identifies disparities for individual dealers or within its portfolio as a whole.

 

How Can the CFPB’s Ombudsman Help You?  On December 6, the CFPB’s Ombudsman’s Office released its annual report. The report describes how the Office can assist consumers, financial institutions, and others with a question, concern, or complaint regarding a CFPB process.

 

Federal Reserve Board Does Some Rule Housekeeping.  On December 18, the FRB proposed a rule that would revise its Reg. M, issued to implement the Consumer Leasing Act. Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CLA was implemented solely by the Board’s Reg. M, which applied to all types of lessors. The DFA transferred rulemaking authority for the CLA to the CFPB; however, the FRB retains authority under the CLA to issue rules applicable to dealers exempt from CFPB rulemaking jurisdiction.  The FRB is proposing to revise its Reg. M and its accompanying Official Staff Commentary to reflect this change. Comments on the proposed rule are due within 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

 

Atten-Hut!  On December 11, the Department of Defense released an interpretive rule for the Military Lending Act to provide additional guidance to industry regarding compliance with its July 2015 final rule amending the MLA’s implementing regulation. The July 2015 rule amended the regulation to extend MLA protections to a broader range of closed-end and open-end credit products. In August 2016, the DOD issued a Q&A interpretive rule to help industry comply with the July 2015 rule. The current amendments to the interpretive rule provide new Q&As in an effort to provide additional guidance concerning compliance with the July 2015 rule, but raise serious questions regarding the sale and financing of ancillary products.

 

Case of the Month

 

In what actually is not a case, but an important enforcement action, Cowboy AG, LLC, a Texas buy-here, pay-here dealer doing business as Cowboy Toyota and Cowboy Scion, recently agreed to settle FTC charges that it used deceptive ads in a regional Spanish-language newspaper. On December 8, the FTC published a description of the proposed settlement agreement in the Federal Register for public comment. The FTC will decide whether to accept the proposed agreement or take other action after it reviews the comments.

 

The FTC alleged that Cowboy’s ads buried fine print English-language disclaimers that contradicted the ads’ more prominent Spanish-language claims. As part of the proposed settlement, Cowboy has agreed that when it must make any information “clear and conspicuous” under the Truth in Lending Act and the Consumer Leasing Act, it will ensure that the information is easily noticeable and easily understandable by ordinary consumers, including a requirement that its disclosures “must appear in each language in which the representation that requires the disclosure appears.” This means that Cowboy must provide Spanish-language disclosures in its Spanish-language ads.

 

Although the FTC has consistently included this foreign language requirement in the definition of “clear and conspicuous” in Section 5(a) FTC Act settlements, this proposed settlement represents an expansion of the foreign language requirement into a settlement that includes TILA and CLA claims. Moreover, it appears that the FTC has announced this broadened “clear and conspicuous” standard through this proposed settlement, instead of through the proper course of notice and comment rulemaking. Because the FTC does not have rulemaking authority under TILA (that authority rests with the CFPB), the FTC appears to be doing by enforcement what it cannot do by rulemaking.

 

The proposed settlement is against one Texas dealer, but it could create a potentially wide-ranging TILA/CLA reinterpretation of the “clear and conspicuous” standard in ads. If you advertise credit terms in a language other than English, see your lawyer, because the Cowboy settlement reflects the FTC’s apparent position that it may be unlawful to provide related TILA-required information in English.

 

So, there’s this month’s roundup!  Stay legal, and we’ll see you next month.


 

Tom (thudson@hudco.com) is Of Counsel and Nikki (nmunro@hudco.com) is a Partner in the law firm of Hudson Cook, LLP. Tom has written several books and is the publisher of Spot Delivery®, a monthly legal newsletter for auto dealers. He is the CEO of CounselorLibrary.com, LLC and the Editor in Chief of CARLAW®, a monthly report of legal developments for the auto finance and leasing industry. Nikki is a contributing author to the F&I Legal Desk Book and frequently writes for Spot Delivery®. For information, visit www.counselorlibrary.com. © CounselorLibrary.com 2018, all rights reserved. Single publication rights only, to the Association. (1/18).  HC/4839-3027-8746v1.

The CARLAWYER©11/17

By Thomas B. Hudson and Nicole F. Munro

 

Here’s our monthly article on legal developments in the auto sales, finance and lease world.  This month, we’re covering actions of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, the Senate, and the President.  As usual, this month’s article features our “Case of the Month.”

Why do we include items from other states? We want to show you legal developments and trends. Also, another state’s laws might be a lot like your state’s laws. If attorneys general or plaintiffs’ lawyers are pursuing particular types of claims in other states, those claims might soon appear in your state.

 

Note that this column does not offer legal advice. Always check with your lawyer to learn how what we report might apply to you, or if you have questions.

 

This Month’s CARLAWYER© Compliance Tip

 

The big news this month, discussed below, is the override of the CFPB’s new arbitration rule.  That’s a real win for dealers who use mandatory arbitration agreements with their car buyers to protect against class action lawsuits, as well as for those not currently doing so but considering such use in the future.  The CFPB’s anti arbitration campaign has been going on for several years.  During that period, many companies using arbitration agreements have been reluctant to spend legal dollars to keep their agreements on the cutting edge of the law.  After all, why waste money if the CFPB is going to abolish the use of the agreements?  Now that we have an industry victory for arbitration, dealers using such agreements might want to make sure their agreements reflect the latest legal developments.  The “Case of the Month,” discussed below, illustrates the value of an effective arbitration agreement.

 

Federal Developments

 

CFPB’s Arbitration Rule Goes Down in Flames.  On October 23, the Treasury Department released a report examining the CFPB’s arbitration rule, which would have effectively prohibited mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts.  The report determined that:

  • the CFPB’s rule would impose extraordinary costs by generating more than 3,000 additional class action lawsuits over the next five years, imposing more than $500 million in additional legal defense fees, and transferring $330 million to plaintiffs’ lawyers;
  • the CFPB’s data show that the majority of consumer class actions deliver no relief to the class members, and few consumers entitled to claim settlement funds actually do;
  • the CFPB failed to consider whether improved arbitration disclosures would serve consumer interests better than its ban;
  • the CFPB did not adequately assess the share of class actions that are meritless; and
  • the CFPB did not show that its rule will improve financial institutions’ compliance with federal consumer financial laws.

The report concluded that the arbitration rule did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites for banning the use of arbitration agreements under the Dodd-Frank Act.

Perhaps partly in response to the Treasury Department’s criticism, on October 25, the U.S. Senate passed a joint resolution to invalidate the CFPB’s rule.  The late evening vote was 51-50, with the vice president breaking the tie.  Despite an eleventh hour personal plea from Director Cordray to let the rule go into effect, the President signed the resolution on November 1, invalidating the rule and eliminating the CFPB’s ability to promulgate another arbitration rule without a new congressional mandate.

FTC Studying Data Security.  The FTC recently announced a public workshop on December 12, 2017, in Washington, D.C., to discuss better ways to identify and measure consumer injuries that result from the misuse of consumers’ personal information.  The FTC is seeking comment on issues including:

  • What are the qualitatively different types of consumer injuries from privacy and data security incidents?
  • What frameworks might we use to assess these different injuries, and how do we quantify injuries?
  • How do businesses evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of collecting and using consumer information in light of potential injuries? and
  • How do consumers evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of sharing information in light of potential injuries?

Justice Reports to Congress.  On September 28, the Justice Department released its annual report to Congress listing its 2016 enforcement activities involving the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.  By the end of 2016, the DOJ had 33 open fair lending investigations related to discrimination in mortgage lending, the sale of manufactured homes, and auto financing.  The report details the DOJ’s Servicemembers and Veterans Initiative, a pilot program through which the DOJ funds Assistant U.S. Attorney and Division trial attorney positions and designates military judge advocates to serve as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to support the DOJ in its SCRA enforcement efforts.  The pilot program will be funded through the end of FY 2018.  In addition, the report discusses settlements with several lenders for alleged violations of the SCRA, including alleged unlawful foreclosures and auto repossessions.   Dealers with significant business with servicemembers should take note of this beefed-up enforcement capability.

Case of the Month

 

Brittany White and Steven Hefter bought a new car from Charlie, Inc., d/b/a Serra Hyundai.  They signed a retail buyers order, a retail installment contract, and a delivery receipt.  The buyers order included an arbitration provision and a spot delivery disclosure.  The RIC stated that any dispute resolution agreement the buyers signed along with the RIC also applied to the RIC.  The delivery receipt included a spot delivery disclosure and stated that it was a part of the buyers order and the RIC.

 

Serra Hyundai could not sell the contract and asked the buyers to return the car.  The buyers sued Serra Hyundai for violating the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and asserted several state law claims.  The buyers asked the court to rule that the contract between the buyers and Serra Hyundai entitled the buyers to keep the car.

 

Serra Hyundai moved to compel arbitration. The court granted Serra Hyundai’s motion, concluding that the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable.  The buyers argued that financing approval was a condition precedent to the existence of a binding contract.  The buyers claimed that because Serra Hyundai did not sell the RIC, the agreement between the buyers and Serra Hyundai, including the arbitration provision, was void.

 

The court disagreed for two reasons.  First, the court explained that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement is severable from the rest of a contract.  As a result, even if the rest of the contract was void, the arbitration provision would be enforceable because the buyers did not challenge it.  Second, the court noted that the arbitration provision was part of the buyers order.  By its terms, the buyers order and the arbitration provision took effect when Serra Hyundai delivered the car to the buyers along with the TILA disclosures.  Because the RIC and the delivery receipt incorporated the arbitration provision, the arbitration agreement applied to all the buyers’ claims.

 

Hefter v. Charlie, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151764 (N.D. Ala. September 19, 2017)

 

So, there’s this month’s roundup!  Stay legal, and we’ll see you next month.


 

Tom (thudson@hudco.com) is Of Counsel and Nikki (nmunro@hudco.com) is a Partner in the law firm of Hudson Cook, LLP. Tom has written several books and is the publisher of Spot Delivery®, a monthly legal newsletter for auto dealers. He is the CEO of CounselorLibrary.com, LLC and the Editor in Chief of CARLAW®, a monthly report of legal developments for the auto finance and leasing industry. Nikki is a contributing author to the F&I Legal Desk Book and frequently writes for Spot Delivery. For information, visit www.counselorlibrary.com. © CounselorLibrary.com 2017, all rights reserved. Single publication rights only, to the Association. (11/17).  HC/4815-6992-3155